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1 Introduction: Why You Should Care About User Concerns
Contact tracing apps are one of the primary technology-facilitated COVID responses currently proposed. In the majority
of Western nations there is the expectation that citizens will have the autonomy to decide whether or not to install a
COVID-related app. Yet, the more users who install a COVID app, the greater the impact on public health. As explained
by Chan et al. [2020] the value of users installing a contact-tracing app grows quadratically with the number of users
who install. How can we get users to install COVID apps? By understanding and mitigating user concerns and tradeoffs.
This document provides a framework for considering the user-relevant components of COVID apps and corresponding
user tradeoffs related to these apps. Specifically, we enumerate user tradeoffs related to data collection, data quality,
identifier/data encryption, privacy invasion, mobile costs, user agency, benefits from app use, and app transparency.
We break down which tradeoffs are relevant for which contact tracing implementations (centralized vs. decentralized,
location- vs. proximity-based). Additionally, we compare contact tracing to an alternative technology-facilitated COVID
solution: narrowcasts. Narrowcasts are location-personalized broadcasts about COVID hotspots in your vicinity.
2 Types of COVID Technological Approaches
There have been a number of papers and articles summarizing possible technology-facilitated COVID responses. Here,
we focus on contact tracing and narrow casting. We refer the reader to other materials (below) to learn about other
potential approaches.
• Contact Tracing
– Centralized: users are assigned an encrypted identifier by a trusted third party (TTP). Users broadcast
their identifier to those within some distance X. Users store lists of identifiers they have been in contact
with. COVID-positive users push a list of contacts during contagious period to TTP. TTP notifies at-risk
users.
– Decentralized: users generate anonymized identifiers for every time period. Users broadcast their
anonymized identifier to those within some distance X. Users store lists of identifiers they have been in
contact with. Positive users push list of their identifiers during contagious period to public list. Users
periodically pull public list and check if they have any contact matches.
• Narrowcast
– Centralized: User pushes their location regularly to TTP. TTP has knowledge of hotspot locations. Server
pushes notifications of hotspots in users’ vicinity that it identifies based on their known locations.
– Decentralized (Local): TTP publishes list of hotspot locations. Local device periodically pulls central list.
Local device tracks users’ location, matches location against central list, and notifies user of hotspots in
users’ vicinity.
• Other types of broadcasts. See Raskar et al. [2020] for a detailed summary.
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Component Description Dependencies
E
xp
lic
it App Architecture Type of app (e.g., centralized, decentralized, narrowcast) –
Provider Who is the app provider and/or the TTP (e.g., CDC, tech company) –
Data Data collected (e.g., proximity/location, health status) & the data quality architecture
Benefit: my health My direct benefits (e.g., knowledge of my risk status, hotspots) architecture, data collected
Benefit: contacts’ health Direct benefits to contacts (e.g., they learn they are at risk) architecture, data collected
Im
pl
ic
it Information Protection How the identifiers and/or data are protected (e.g., pseudoanonymized, encrypted) architecture
Privacy Costs Who can learn what about me (e.g., neighbor can learn my health status) architecture, data collected
Mobile Costs What will installing this app cost me? (e.g., battery life, GB of data used) architecture (pull vs. push)
User Agency What do I control (data deletion, what I reveal) architecture
Benefit: environment safety Others having app makes my environment safer others actions
Benefit: sense of altruism Feeling like I helped others
Benefit: epidemiological data e.g., decision makers know spread, infection rate architecture
Transparency How transparent the app provider makes the implicit components
Table 1: Components of COVID apps.
• Full surveillance using e.g., telecomm infrastructure. See Troncoso et al. [2020].
• Mobile contact tracing interviews: technology-facilitated interviews by CDC for traditional contact tracing.
See Chan et al. [2020].
• Symptom checkers and self-diagnosis tools (e.g., thermometer checks). See the EU toolbox eHealth Network
[2020].
• Home health support: easy contact with doctor & advice for diagnosed / at-risk patients. See the EU
toolbox eHealth Network [2020].
3 What are the components of a COVID app?
Table 1 delineates the user-relevant components of a COVID app.
Explicit vs. Implicit. It is important to note that some of these components are explicit to the user (e.g., we can
reasonably assume that the user will know who is providing the app they download). While others (e.g., who might be
able to learn the users’ data) may not necessarily be made transparent (i.e., explicit) to the user by the app provider. In
the absence of app transparency, the user may have their own, accurate or inaccurate, expectations about these implicit
components.
4 Potential User Considerations
In this section we delineate users’ potential considerations (e.g., concerns) related to the app components summarized
in Section 3. Users may be more or less willing to install a COVID app depending on these concerns.
Note that these tradeoffs focus specifically on the app components. This is not a comprehensive list of all user
motivations to install COVID apps (or reasons to avoid them). Additional user-related factors that may make users
more or less willing to install COVID apps (e.g., level of concern about COVID) are addressed briefly in Section 6.
4.1 Provider
There are many entities who could provide a COVID app. I draw this list from prior work Hargittai and Redmiles
[2020].
• Health protection agency (e.g., CDC, FDA)
• Health insurer (e.g., BlueCrossBlueShield, Aetna)
• Employer
• Technology company (e.g., Microsoft, Google)
• Federal government other than a health protection agency
• Local government
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• Non-profit organization
• International organization (e.g., UN, WHO)
• University
User Considerations. Prior work suggests that users differ in their willingness to install COVID apps provided by
these different entities Hargittai and Redmiles [2020].
4.2 Data
There are two types of data that can be collected from users in these systems.
• Contact Tracing
– Proximities (who you have been in contact with, where the "who" is anonymized)
– Locations (where you have been)
• Positive status
– Official (determined by a positive COVID test or health care diagnosis)
– Self Reported
* Symptoms (temperature readings, cough, etc.) from which positive status is inferred
* Positive status ("I have COVID")
User Considerations. Different users may have different perceptions of the acceptability of different contact-tracing
data and the quality of the positive status data. The quality of the positive status data varies by how positive status is
determined: from official data or from one of two types of self reported data.
4.3 Privacy Costs
The app architecture and what data the app collects influence potential privacy costs to the user. Privacy costs can be
thought of in user terms as: “who can learn what about me”.
There are five potential “whats” that can be learned about a user:
• Who can learn I am COVID-positive
• Who can learn I am at-risk (have been exposed to someone COVID-positive)
• Who can learn the/my social graph (i.e., who I have had contact with regardless of my health status)
• Who can learn my locations
• Who can learn that I have the app installed
• Who can learn the COVID-status of my social group (e.g., other people of my race)1.
There are six potential “whos” that can learn these pieces of information about a user:
• Someone who can place a bluetooth beacon at your primary location (neighbor, employer)
• Contacts (those who receive your broadcasts)
• Nation state (e.g., highly resourced adversary who can place bluetooth beacons and surveillance cameras)
• Attacker: includes both less resourced adversaries and nation states
• Trusted third party in centralized system
• Individual who works at the trusted third party and who can associate app user identifiers with their true
identity
User Considerations. Different users may rank these costs differently or not perceive them as costs at all. Potential for
Inequity. The potential for tracking COVID-status by social group may increase marginalization of underrepresented
groups (as has already been a concern with high rates of COVID infection among communities of color Eligon et al.
[2020]).
1In a centralized system the TTP may be able to assign encrypted identifiers in such a way that it can track social groups Troncoso
et al. [2020]
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4.4 Mobile Costs
COVID app architectures result in different mobile costs. For example, contact tracing apps require the user to frequently
use bluetooth, which has known impacts on battery life Wha. Similarly, whether the app has push or pull architecture
may also have implications for users’ mobile costs such as:
• Data costs (MB of mobile plan used for the app).
• Storage costs (MB of space on the mobile phone used for the app).
• Battery performance costs (impact on battery life from using the app).
• Other app performance costs (impact on speed of other apps / network speed from using the app).
User Considerations / Potential for Inequity. Mobile costs are a potential source of inequity: less resourced users
who are known to have less-featured / older mobile devices and are more likely to have limited mobile data Center
[2019], Smith and Page [2015]. These users may be disadvantaged by or unable to use apps with high mobile costs or
whose functionality their devices do not support.
4.5 User Agency
Different COVID app implementations give users different levels of agency over their data. In the suggested implemen-
tations considered here, users always have the agency to decide whether to reveal their COVID-positive health status to
an app.
• Control over data retention: user vs. TTP
• Control over length of data retention: auto-specified (e.g., 2 weeks) or user can decide to delete all data at any
time
User Considerations. Users may have different preferences for the tradeoff between autonomy vs. decision-burden
offered by apps with different implementations.
4.6 Benefits
COVID contact tracing apps have different possible benefits depending on their implementation:
Individual-only benefits:
1. Knowledge of my risk: I learn if I have been exposed to someone who has COVID
2. Knowledge of hotspots: I learn where there is a high rate of COVID
3. Feeling of Altruism: I feel good about myself for using the app because I feel that I am helping society / others
Individual and group benefit:
4. Environment safety: my country/community/environment has lower infection rate, if people take action on the
basis of app information
Group benefits:
5. My contacts learn their risk: people I have come into contact with are able to learn if they are at-risk if I
become COVID positive
6. Epidemiological data: My use of the app allows for some entity to learn one or more of:
• Infection rate: how many people are COVID positive (infection rate)
• Spread: how many people are at risk of COVID (have been exposed)
Note, I do not include changes in institutional response (e.g., a state shortening the lockdown period, supermarkets
changing their store hours) because the user cannot know for sure that this epidemiological data will be used to inform
these decisions, nor that the decisions will be in alignment with their own goals. As discussed below, the value of the
last benefit thus depends on the users’ beliefs regarding whether/how this data will be used.
User Considerations. The relevance of these benefits to users depends on:
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• whether or not the user plans on taking action once they learn that they are at-risk (1,2)
• whether the user cares about the safety of those around them (3, 4,5)
• whether the user thinks that others will take action once they learn that they are at risk (4)
• whether the user believes that epidemiological data will be used / should be used to inform govern-
ment/institutional COVID planning (e.g., lockdown lengths, PPE orders, hospital capacity planning) and
whether the user cares about this planning (6)
Potential for Inequity. The hotspot feature has a potential for inequity / negative impacts on marginalized communities.
Less resourced and minority communities have, thus far, experienced higher rates of COVID Eligon et al. [2020] due to
a number of factors. Hotspots may lead to increased marginalization of these communities and reduction in economic
stimulus (e.g., some groups avoiding shopping in these areas).
5 User-relevant Approach Tradeoffs
Architecture Centralized Decentralized
Data Collected Location None Proximity (ids) Location Proximity (ids) Location
➕  Data Quality
Information 
Protection No N/A Identifiers encrypted Identifiers encrypted Identity key hidden  Data fully encrypted Pseudoidentifiers No
• location • location 
• granular hotspots • granular hotspots
Transparency
Image Credit: Elissa M. Redmiles, Microsoft Research. User Concerns & Tradeoffs in Technology-Facilitated Contact Tracing. https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.13219
Mobile Costs Push only system
Pull system + 
compute location 
matches locally
Bluetooth always on
Narrowcast
Official
--
Implementation dependent (self-report vs official)
TTP,  TTP individual w/ identity key, hacker 
learn: 
• app installed
• ➕
• at-risk status
• social graph 
Push + pull system
Decentralized
Contact Tracing
Contacts, nation state can learn: 
•  app installed
• ➕
TTP,hacker learn:
• app installed
• ➕
• at-risk status
• social graph 
• (if location data, 
location)
nothing
Centralized
Push only system
Dependendent on what app providers choose to make explicit regarding data encryption, privacy costs, mobile costs, agency & non-explicit benefits
Privacy Costs TTP knows location
Neighbor/employer can learn: 
•  app installed
• ➕  
Benefits know hotspots in your vicinitygranularity dep on  official data quality
• Epidemiologists learn spread: count (at risk) • Epidemiology learns spread: count (at risk) iff those who are at risk reveal this
• Know whether you are at risk
• Those you've been in contact with learn they are at risk if you are ➕
• Your environment becomes safer | if those in environment act on their knowledge of their risk
• Sense of altruism
• Epidemiologists learn infection rate: count (➕ )
Agency N/A N/A
 You decide whether to reveal/let others learn ➕
TTP controls data retention
You control data retention 
(dep. on implementation)
Figure 1: User-relevant tradeoffs between technologically-facilitated COVID approaches.
Table 1 summarizes the user-relevant tradeoffs between the different contact-tracing and broadcast approaches, which
are segmented by architecture, data collection, and encryption.
Here we highlight the most critical differences.
Broadcast vs. Contact Tracing. Across all implementations broadcast apps differ in that broadcast apps:
• (Privacy costs) at most know user location
• (Mobile costs) do not require bluetooth to be on
• (Benefit) can only tell users about hotspots
Centralized vs. Decentralized Contact Tracing. Contact tracing apps differ on the following axes:
• (Privacy costs)
– Centralized: Allow a TTP, individual at the TTP who knows the link between identifiers and real identity,
and an attacker who hacks the TTP and the identifier link to learn whether you have the app installed,
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who is COVID-positive, who is at risk (COVID-exposed), and the social graph (who has had contact with
whom) in the absence of testing COVID positive.
– Decentralized solutions have no TTP the only thing an attacker (contacts, or nation state with surveillance
devices and bluetooth beacons) in a decentralized system can learn is whether you have the app installed
or are COVID-positive.
• (Mobile costs):
– Centralized: push
– Decentralized: pull
• (User Agency)
– Centralized: TTP determines data retention
– Decentralized: You can audit when data is deleted and depending on implementation, you can choose to
delete at any time
• (Benefits)
– Centralized: epidemiology data is available regarding spread (count of number of at risk persons)
– Decentralized: spread data is available only if at risk people share this data with an epidemiology server
Location vs. Proximity Data. Apps that collect users location data differ from those that don’t collect this data in two
ways:
• (Privacy costs): location can be learned
• (Benefits): hotspot information can be provided (note, decentralized broadcasts offer this without location data
collection)
6 Additional Factors That May Influence COVID App Adoption
Other Features/Benefits. Users may be more or less willing to install COVID apps that have benefits from additional
non-contact tracing/narrowcast features. These features may be possible to include in contact tracing or narrowcast apps,
but have additional privacy costs and architectural considerations that we do not consider here. These features/benefits
include2 functionality related to: symptoms (e.g., symptom checkers, self-diagnosis tools), public health information
(trustworthy general information and guidelines), and home health support (support for quarantined COVID-positive/at-
risk patients e.g, personalized medical advice, contact with a doctor).
User Factors. Whether or not a user is willing to install a COVID app may depend on large list of user-specific factors.
I have compiled a, by no means complete, list of these factors (some of which is drawn from my prior work with
Hargittai Hargittai and Redmiles [2020]):
• Their current or previous health status (e.g., COVID positive)
• The current or previous health status (e.g., COVID positive) and outcomes (death) of those they care about
• Non-physical health-related negative experiences they (or those they care about) have had as a result of COVID
(e.g., layoff, bankruptcy, business loss, etc.)
• Their level of fear of one of the aforementioned negative experiences
• Their locus of control: do they think they can take action to reduce their risk from COVID if they do and/or do
not know their exposure status
• Their knowledge of COVID
• The directness of their involvement with COVID (e.g., medical worker, essential worker)
• Their level of concern about COVID’s impact on a variety of entities including themselves, those they care
about, and their community along the lines of both physical health, lockdown/mental health, and economic
wellbeing
• Their level of concern about COVID consequences related to the economy and etc.
• Their exposure to media about COVID
• Their sociodemographics (race, income, age, gender, educational attainment, urban/rural, etc.)
• ...
2With thanks to Marina Micheli at the EU Data Commission for this language.
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